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“ Front-Loading ” Problem-Solving in Co-Development:  
Managing the Contractual, Organisational and Cognitive dimensions. 
 
Abstract: “ Front-loading ” problem-solving is one of the major strategies to 
reduce development costs and development lead time. In co-development 
situations, the implementation of such methodologies rises specific questions, due 
to the difficult partition in responsabilities and skills between the car 
manufacturer and the supplier, especially when customer and supplier 
contributions cannot be clearly interfaced in a “ black-box sourcing ” relation. 
This results in a difficult and permanent debate about design modifications.  
The article analyses such a co-development situation in the case of a car 
manufacturer and its die design and engineering suppliers. The case illustrate how 
to combine organizational integration (i.e. co-localization, shared  development 
methodologies) with new economic contracting rules which create front-loading 
problem-solving incentives for the two partners. We compare the economic 
outcomes of a traditional process with a co-developped project, from the 
viewpoint of both the customer and the suppliers. 
The study demonstrates how co-development played a major role in reducing the 
number and cost of modifications for the customer. The benefits which suppliers 
can earn depend on their ability to involve in the project in terms of design and 
engineering capacity at an early stage. These results generate theoretical outputs 
which bridge the gap between incentive and contract theories on one side, and 
cognitive and learning fields on the other. 
 
Key words : concurrent engineering, co-development, contracts, learning, die 
design.  
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Introduction 
 
“ Front-loading ” problem-solving (Thomke et Fujimoto, 2000) is one of the 
major strategies to reduce development costs and development lead time (Midler, 
1995, p 369). In co-development situations, the implementation of such 
methodologies rises specific questions, due to the difficult partitions in 
responsabilities and skills between the car manufacturer and the supplier. The 
problem is particularly important when customer and supplier contributions 
cannot be clearly interfaced in a “ black-box sourcing ” relation. The result is a 
difficult and permanent debate about design modifications.  
The article analyses such a co-development situation in the case of a car 
manufacturer and its die design and engineering suppliers. For the car 
manufacturer, the target is to reduce the number of dies modifications number and 
thereby the budget, which has a major impact on the global performance of the 
projects. But on the other side, in the traditional relationship, modifications 
appear for the supplier as a important complementary revenue. Therefore, the 
codevelopment efficiency depends on the capacity to combine organisational 
integration (i.e. co-localization, communication, ...) and adapted shared front-
loading methodologies with new economic contracting rules which create front-
loading problem-solving incentives for the two partners. 
This article analyses a case experimenting such a combination of new 
organizational and contracting co-development practices. It is based on interactive 
research conducted with an European auto-maker, and of a representative sample 
of the company’s stamping-tool suppliers (Garel 1999). Following the 
outsourcing of stamping operations in the early 1990s, this auto-maker, which we 
will refer to as “X,” wished to evaluate its new partnerships with suppliers. In the 
context of a study conducted over a period of two years, we were able to cross-
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analyse the viewpoints of both the customer and its suppliers. In order to assess 
the profits and losses generated by co-development, we did a comparative study 
of two successive automotive projects: a TR (Traditional) project, conducted 
without co-development from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, and the 
following4, a CD (Co-Development) project, pioneered jointly with the tool-
makers in the early-mid 1990s. We analysed the performance of four European 
tool-makers (A, B, C, D) participating in both the TR and CD projects. The field 
study was conducted from December 1995 to July 1997. We drew on internal data 
collected from Auto-Maker X and its suppliers (files, reports, notes, etc.); on re-
assessments made at our request (submitted by the firms); on interviews (over 
thirty); and on regular cross-checking carried out by the steering committee of the 
interactive research. 
 
In the first part of this article, we will analyse the differences in the two studied 
development processes, by refering to our characterization of the co-development 
concept. In the second, we present our comparison of co-development 
performance with traditional design process one. The research was targeted on the 
development and investment costs. An important characteristic of our 
methodology is that it reflected not only the car manufacturers viewpoint, but also 
the suppliers economic vision (the methodology was validated both by the auto-
maker and the suppliers).  We present the results of this analysis in section 2 .2. 
As will become apparent, these results substantiate the hypothesis of a “win-win” 
situation between customer and supplier, although not all suppliers reaped the 
same benefits. In the third and final section, we discuss our results through an 
analysis of the advantages accruing from co-development in terms of two 
variables: supplier engineering skills; and long-term stability of the auto-
maker/supplier relationship. This analysis supports the need for systematic 
                                                 
4 The launching of the second project was two years after the first one 
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integration into the theoretical design-performance model of organizational, 
incentive and cognitive factors. 
 
1. Comparison of TR and CD processes on organizational and contract 
variables. 
 
Many authors have contributed to define the partnership and co-development 
notions. Consistently with those of those Lamming (1993) and Liker, Ettlie and 
Campbell, (1995), we will characterize co-development processes in terms of five 
conditioning factors (Midler, Garel and Kesseler, 1997). The idea being that co-
development efficiency is the result of a global coherency of this set of variables. 
 
- The early selection of a supplier, based on strategic criteria, for a cooperative 
endeavor lasting throughout the duration of the development process. 
The die tools development includes two phases (see figure 1): phase 1 is a design 
period and ends in a technical specification freeze of the tool. Phase two is a 
production period of the tools. For project TR, Phase 1 lasted for 4 months, 
compared to 18 months for Project CD. Phase 2, on the contrary, was shorter for 
Project CD. It has been further extended for more recent projects5. 
For CD Project, the customer-supplier relationship was formed at the beginning of 
phase one, the selection being made on the basis of positive previous experience 
with the suppliers, and on the customer’s long-term strategic objectives. For TR 
project, this relationship was established only after the technical definition of the 
new product had been completed, at the end of phase 1, on the result of the cost 
bidding process.  
 
                                                 
5 Time to-market strategies focus on reduction of leadtime between specifications freeze and 
market introduction. 
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Figure 1: Co-development and the extended supplier time involvement 
PROJET TR
PROJET CD
Implication des fournisseurs
Implication des fournisseurs Temps
PHASE 1 (plateau) PHASE 2
PHASE 1 PHASE 2
 
 
 
- Supplier involvement affecting a broader operational perimeter. 
Co-development implies a shift from basic-component supply to transactions 
involving complete vehicle sub-systems. In the metal-stamping field, assignments 
to tool-makers are today made by the total lot, and are based on the physical 
perimeters defining an entire system (for example, all the stamped pieces for a 
door); whereas, formerly, assignments were made component-by-component and 
awarded to the lowest bidder. This way, interface problems between individual 
components (the geometric fit and visual appeal of the body as a whole) are all 
handled by the same supplier. Figure 2 gives the difference between TR and CD 
projects concerning components in a lot assigned to major supplier.  
 
Figure 2 : comparison of component assignment to TR and CD suppliers. 
Number of components 
assigned to major supplier /  
total number of components 
in the lot 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
 
(en %) 
Projet TR 3/5 8/50 4/7 6/23 10/12 5/14 46% 
Projet CD 5/5 23/32 7/7 12/12 6/8 8/12 85% 
 
 
- Adoption of joint development methodologies focused on front-loading and 
learning. 
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A design process inevitably implies unforeseen problems and modifications not 
included in the original specifications. The skills which need to be mobilized for a 
design operation are hard to define and coordinate (Schön, 1983; Nonaka, 1994). 
It is therefore more important to learn quickly together than to initially agree on a 
detailled (but rapidly obsolete) definition of the future product. In this 
perspective, the agreement between two firms must be consistent in terms of joint 
work procedures and the means for dealing with unexpected problems or revised 
objectives. 
 
The comparison of TR and CD project is typical of such a transition. In TR 
project, the machine tools suppliers did not participate in the design phase. 
Consensus was reached on a basis of theoretical initial technical specifications 
that had not been validated by those (the suppliers) who were supposed to 
implement them. In CD project on the contrary, the machine tool suppliers were 
involved in the colocated project through residential engineers from the beginning 
of the design. Common methodologies were negociated to identify problems 
quickly, to jointly formulate possible solutions, evaluate their economic impact, 
implement them, and finally optimize the elimination of decision-making inertia 
when effecting the required modifications. Those methodologies implied 
development of mock up, problem solving data base, sharing of the CAD 
specifications… During the course of the project, the proposals made by the 
various players in the design process were open for discussion and revision. 
Typically, suppliers were supposed to alert and ask for design changes when they 
anticipated feasability problems. They were supposed to adopt such a proactive 
alerting role, as opposed to a passive reaction to customer inspections.  
 
- The supplier’s commitment to an overall result, measured in terms of quality, 
cost, and time. 
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In co-development, the supplier’s commitment covers the total design / testing / 
production / delivery process. The customer must be certain that the supplier will 
use its significant margin of manoeuvre to carry out the co-development project 
in the direction initially planned.  
Due to this principle, the initial contract in project CD fixes globally the 
remuneration with special clauses dealing with modifications, as described in the 
following §. The shift to co-development transforms negotiated pricing into 
effective remuneration for suppliers; whereas budget overruns were usual under 
the traditional system.  
 
- The integration of economic and technical imperatives : the contracting rules 
about modifications 
In traditional projects the economic relation is ruled between purchasing and 
commercial agents who are largely cut off from the engineering arena of 
manufacturer and supplier. The dissociation is also temporal : first there are the 
technical decisions within the auto-maker,  then the bidding and the economic 
negotiation, then the technical achievement, and lastly, the negotiation about the 
modifications. Under co-development, economic negotiation becomes a process 
of building value through the design process (during which technical variants are 
costed, the effects of modifications evaluated, etc.). Suppliers’ remuneration is 
the result of specific achievement benchmarks, rather than solely made on the 
basis of accounting considerations formulated by the customer’s purchasing 
department. 
The contracting rules about design modification experimented on the CD project 
is typical in that perspective. Modifications are a classical problem in the auto 
industry. They can vary in importance: from the shift of an opening on a 
component, to a change in the overall style of the product. Budget overruns 
caused by modifications could previously reach 20% to 30% in the studied firm 
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on a given project. For the auto-maker, a major advantage of the shift to co-
development is that modifications tend to be reduced in number. Modifications 
carried out during Phase 2 are the most costly. To embark on Phase 2 is to embark 
on the stage of project irreversibility, or project reversibility only at an extremely 
high cost. Tardy discovery of the need for modifications involves heavy 
additional costs, since at this stage, the modifications must be made on the 
finished tools rather than on the preliminary designs. In other words, 
modifications can be very valuable during Phase 1, but are extremely costly 
during Phase 2.  
Under the sub-contracting system, each modification becomes the subject of an 
amendment to the initial contract. Suppliers are free to negotiate a low initial 
price, since they know they will have an opportunity to “hike it up” during the life 
of the project. In order to persuade suppliers to play the game of early 
modification identification, the co-development contract includes (importantly) a 
clause specifying that no additional costs will be paid for late identification of the 
need for modifications. A comparison between the traditional and the co-
development systems is quite illuminating in this regard. 
 
Figure 3: Payment of modification costs in sub-contracting system 
 
 Phase 1 (low cost for 
anticipated modification) 
Phase 2 (high cost for 
unanticipated modification) 
Coming from 
Customer  
Customer  Customer  
Coming from 
Supplier 
 Customer 
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Under the sub-contracting system, Auto-Maker X is wholly responsible for 
modifications. In Phase 1, since suppliers do not participate in the design phase of 
the project under this system, modifications cannot originate with suppliers. 
During Phase 2, if the tool-makers suggest modifications, Auto-Maker X must 
pay the costs, since he bears sole responsibility for the design. 
 
Figure 4: Payment of modification costs in co-development system 
 
 Phase 1 (low cost for 
anticipated modifications) 
Phase 2 (high cost for 
unanticipated modifications) 
Coming from 
Customer  
Supplier (1)  Customer (3) 
Coming from 
Supplier 
Supplier (2)  Supplier (4)  
 
(1) During Phase 1, the cost of modifications originating with the customer is 
defrayed by the tool-maker without any change in the contract. Suppliers are thus 
encouraged to seek compensation for cost overruns generated by the maker (e.g.: 
style changes, modifications in the safety system, etc.). This compensation, which 
reflects an improvement in tool design, leads to a reduction in tool costs (e.g.: 
reduction in the number of tools per vehicle-model from five to three). This clause 
motivates suppliers to provide any expertise not possessed by the auto-maker at 
the earliest possible opportunity. The converse of this argument runs as follows: if 
the auto-maker were to pay for all the modifications originating with it, tool-
makers would not be motivated to compensate for them and would thus become 
less involved in the planning stages.6 This incentive system has already been 
observed at firm J by Aoki (1994), who maintains that the more auto-makers 
protect sub-contractors from risk, i.e. the more responsibility auto-makers assume 
                                                 
6 Suppliers can, however, contest the pertinence of a modification required by Auto-Maker X by referring it 
to a panel of peer assessors that meets at the conclusion of the project. 
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for cost overruns resulting from modifications, the less incentive suppliers will 
have to pursue innovation on their own. 
(2) When suppliers pay the costs for Phase 1 modifications, they are encouraged 
to propose only those improvements that will result in lower tool costs. This is 
because, when suppliers lower the cost for tools during Phase 1, they improve 
their own profit margin, since they are contractually guaranteed payment at the 
price fixed during initial negotiation. Improvements originating with suppliers 
“go straight into the suppliers’ own pockets”. 
(3) Auto-makers have an incentive to identify themselves needed modifications 
during Phase 1, since they will have to pay unanticipated modifications during 
Phase 2 themselves. This is the only exception to the fixed-price nature of the 
contract. 
(4) When assuming total responsibility for tool design under co-development 
systems, suppliers pay the costs for all modifications originating with them. The 
high cost of Phase 2 modifications, acts as an incentive for identifying the need 
for modifications during Phase 1. 
To sum up: since all Phase 2 modifications represent increased costs for the party 
identifying the need for them, this acts as an incentive for early identification. 
During Phase 1, suppliers are motivated to reduce the costs of the tools for which 
they are responsible by improving their design. 
 
2. EVALUATION OF CO-DEVELOPMENT COST PERFORMANCE 
 
2.1. Methodology. 
Our study is comparative, evaluating the respective results of two projects: one 
carried out according to the traditional sub-contracting approach (TR project), and 
the other according to the conditioning factors described above (CD project). Our 
approach is differential: we have measured the performance differentials between 
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TR and CD projects. Hypothetically, the profit/loss differential observed between 
the two projects can be attributed to the shift (in one case) to the co-development 
method. Both projects studied were very similar in terms of vehicle-model, year 
of launching (less than two years of difference); also economic assessments were 
made in constant French francs (base: year of TR project). Furthermore, the basis 
of comparison for aggregating data was the same. 
Our comparison is based on the analysis of three cost indicators: the estimated 
cost, the negotiated price and the value of modifications. 
- In order to evaluate Phase 1 performance, we measured, for all tools on Projects 
TR and CD, the differential between tool cost at the beginning of Phase 1 (or 
estimated cost) and cost of the same tools at the conclusion of Phase 1. The first 
cost corresponds to the initial technical evaluation of the tools. We call this 
“estimated cost,” and it serves as the basis for all of our measurements. Initial 
specifications for the tools are provided by the systems-engineers of Auto-Maker 
X: the customer knows how to specify the type of tools it wants to receive from 
the supplier. The same method of calculation—a widely recognized one, 
employed by suppliers—was used to determine the two costs on both projects. 
Calculations that do not appear were made for research purposes by the methods 
department at Auto-Maker X. 
- In order to evaluate the impact of co-development on the auto-maker-supplier 
negociation, we have measured the differentials between estimated tool costs and 
costs negotiated with suppliers for TR and CD Projects. 
- Finally, we have measured the value of Phase 2 modifications as a percentage 
of estimated tool costs for TR and CD projects. 
The above indicators could be documented with the auto-makers data. The access 
to suppliers data was more difficult. These suppliers were competing with each 
other and were conducting negotiations with Auto-Maker X at the time of the 
research. The problems were solved due to both the credibility previously 
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established by the field researcher (Garel, 1994), and to lengthy discussions 
undertaken with each supplier. A questionnaire and survey agreement enabled 
each supplier to understand our study objectives, and to prepare for each of our 
visits. Our investigation sought to evaluate the effects of co-development on the 
strategy, organization, and resources (human, design, plant, etc.) of these firms; 
and on the customer/supplier relationship from the viewpoint of the suppliers 
(commercial negotiation, contract signing, work at the planning stage, etc.). Two 
studies devoted to modifications for TR and CD projects and to the economic 
performances of these firms were also conducted. 
 
2.2. Results of the co-development performance measurement 
- A reduction in tool costs. Co-development generated a 7% reduction in tool 
costs at the end of Phase 1, whereas the traditional sub-contracting system posted 
a cost overrun of 11%. A tool-by-tool study shows that the reduction for the CD 
project reflects improvement in tool design during Phase 1, i.e. during 
participation of suppliers at the planning stage. For example, Supplier A 
succeeded in improving the process for one lot of tools under the CD project by 
reducing the number of tools from 12 to 4, representing a cost reduction of 48%. 
By contrast, the TR project registered an increase in the complexity of the tooling 
process during Phase 1 due to problems with delivering pertinent expertise in a 
logical sequence during the planning stage, to the lack of an improvement-
incentive clause, and to the absence of the suppliers’ own experts. We concluded 
that, under co-development, the Auto-Maker achieves savings equal to the cost 
overruns on the TR project (11%), and that suppliers will increase their profit 
margins if they can reduce tool costs (7%). 
 
- An increase in the negotiated price. For the two partners, what effect does co-
development have on the negotiated tool price? It is clear that under co-
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development the auto-maker pays more for tools during the initial negotiation, 
since the suppliers must anticipate modifications and profit margins during a 
single negotiation, with no hope of renegotiation. In fact, under the CD project, 
negotiated tool prices averaged at 23% higher than initial costing or cost 
estimates. Under the TR project, the differential was 16% (discrepancy = 7%, 
which is a benefit for the suppliers and a loss for the auto-maker). For suppliers, 
this differential measures the cost of future risks. Auto-Maker X did not, 
however, “push” the negotiation too hard for this initial co-development 
experiment under the CD project.  
 
- A sharply reduced investment in modifications. The number of Phase 2 
modifications was significantly reduced. They accounted for 49% of estimated 
tool cost under the TR project, compared to only 15% under the CD project (delta 
= 34%). In other words, investment in modifications under co-development were 
divided by almost 3.5, the result of a major reduction in modification volume. 
This observation is unique in the history of the automotive industry. The 34% 
reduction of modifications cost is clearly a profit for the auto-maker. We agree 
with the suppliers in considering that the reduction in modifications constituted a 
net loss in revenues, compensated by advantages obtained in production 
management (plant-flow equalization during Phase 2 was much easier, and 
production-times were shortened), and by the possibility of doing other business 
(income-generating business) during the time-period freed by modification 
reduction. Therefore, as a working figure, we have entered 0. 
 
The figure 5 presents these results as a profit-loss balance sheet for auto-maker 
and suppliers. 
 
Figure 5: Overall Co-Development Balance Sheet 
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Auto-Maker Suppliers 
PROFITS LOSSES PROFITS LOSSES  
 
 
 
Co-
engineering  
performance: 
11% 
 
 
 
Non-
renegotiation  
of contract: 
7% 
Co-
engineering 
performance: 
7% 
Non-
renegotiation  
of contract : 
7% 
  
 
 
Phase 1 
 
Reduction in 
modifications: 
34%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduction in 
modifications: 
0% 
 
 
 
Phase 2 
Total : + 38%  Total : + 14% 
 
 
Co-development appears here clearly as a win-win game. However, the 
aggregate-result effect conceals a genuine disparity. Only a supplier-by-supplier 
profit/loss breakdown (still in terms of the TR/CD differential) can provide the 
clear demonstration making further analysis possible (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Co-development profit/loss matrix 
 
  Auto-Maker X Suppliers 
Supplier A Pha 1 Co-Engineering 
Performance 
PROFIT: 18% PROFIT: 19% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract LOSS: 16% PROFIT: 16% 
 Phase 2 Modification reduction  PROFIT: 23% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 25% PROFIT: 35% 
Supplier B Pha 1 Co-Engineering 
Performance 
PROFIT: 10% PROFIT: 0.1% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract PROFIT: 1% LOSS : 1% 
 Phase 2 Modification reduction  PROFIT: 25% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 36% LOSS: 0.9% 
Supplier C Pha 1 Co-Engineering 
Performance 
PROFIT: 0% PROFIT: 4% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract  LOSS: 6% PROFIT: 6% 
 Phase 2 Modification reduction  PROFIT: 68% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 62% PROFIT: 10% 
Supplier D Pha 1 Co-Engineering 
Performance 
PROFIT: 7% LOSS: 12% 
 Non-renegotiation of contract LOSS: 21% PROFIT: 21% 
 Phase 2 Modification reduction  PROFIT: 17% - 
 TOTAL PROFIT: 3% PROFIT : 9% 
 
There is a clear differential in these results: between profits and losses, between 
profit levels, between customer and suppliers, and among the various suppliers. 
How can these be explained? 
 
 
 
 
3. EARNING PROFITS FROM THE CO-DEVELOPMENT SITUATION 
Co-development is advantageous to those suppliers capable of developing their 
design expertise on a long term.  
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3.1. Supplier expertise 
Tool-maker profitability is heavily dependent on engineering expertise. We have 
noted and verified a strong positive correlation between supplier performance and 
supplier design-capacity as measured in a given supplier’s (1) human resources 
(Kay 1993; Grant 1991); (2) technological resources; and (3) organizational 
resources. 
 
Figure 7: Selected data on supplier engineering-resources 
Suppliers Engineerin
g staff 
(studies, 
programmi
ng and 
simulation) 
Design 
staff as a 
% of 
firm’s 
total work 
force 
Total 
number of 
individuals 
qualified to 
participate 
in planning 
Existence 
of a 
project 
structure 
Digital 
Studies 
Rate of 
study 
sub-
contract
-ing 
Number 
of CAD 
/ CAM 
work-
stations 
A7 base 100 base 100 base 100 yes yes average base 100
B 33% 84% 20% yes yes  low 50% 
C 50% 123% 50% yes yes average 75% 
D 20% 130% 30% no no high 25% 
 
The Supplier B and D age-pyramids are relatively older than those of Suppliers A 
and C, a difference explained by the fact that design-department employees tend 
to be younger than those in other departments. It also reflects the considerable 
investment made by Suppliers A and C in a youthful and highly-qualified work 
force.8 These young recruits also reflect heavy technological investment in 
digitalization and simulation—investments9 enabling these suppliers to reduce 
design time and improve the management of unforeseen Phase 1 modifications. 
 
                                                 
7N.B. for reasons of confidentiality, we decided to express the data relative to Suppliers B, C, and D in a 
percentage of the base 100 corresponding to Supplier A, and to mask data on sub-contracting rates for design 
studies (average rate = approximately 50%).  
8 It is nevertheless the most highly-qualified suppliers, and often those of longest-standing, who participated 
in the auto-maker’s Phase 1 planning stage. It should also be noted that metal-stamping as a field has 
historically had a long tradition of apprenticeship. 
9 For example, apart from training costs, a fully-equipped 3-D CAD workstation costs approximately FF 
300,000. 
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Tool-Maker D has not developed a design department or planning facilities and, 
in the absence of a project team, this firm—small in size and European in scope—
cannot offer co-development expertise to its customers. Its design department has 
not been significantly modernized. Studies are not digital, and investments in 
CAD are low. Despite a large design staff in terms of percentage of total work 
force, Supplier D sub-contracts much of its design-study work. However, this 
sub-contracting is poorly handled and creates a dependency situation for the tool-
maker in relation to his own design-study suppliers.10 The lack of project 
structure has created coordination problems between customer and supplier. 
Supplier D is the only one which did not reap any advantages from participation 
in Phase 1, and modification reduction was negligible. In contrast to the 
operations carried out with Suppliers A, B, and C, the auto-maker’s engineers 
were forced to make trips during Phase 2 to the premises of tool-maker D more 
often under the CD project than under the TR project, in order to compensate for 
this lack of skills (Figure 8). Co-development revealed the structural weaknesses 
of this supplier. 
 
Figure 8: Number of monthly visits to suppliers by Auto-Maker X representative 
during Phase 2 
 
Suppliers Non Co-Development Co-Development 
A 1 1 
B 4 1 
C 2 0.5 
D 0.5 2 
 
                                                 
10 The field covered by these design consultancies is industrial design in general and not machine-tools in 
particular. This non-specificity is reflected in the tardy identification of problems, since Supplier D does not 
possess the means for verifying all sub-contracted design work. Here we see that in order to sub-contract 
effectively, knowledge of how the job should be done must already be possessed internally. Tardy 
identification of errors creates tensions in the relationships between the design consultancy and the tool-
maker’s plant and are costly in terms of wasted time. 
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Tool-Maker B developed its design resources extensively for the planning stage, 
and also implemented a dedicated project structure. The design-department work 
force increased by 150% over four years. This firm concluded partnership 
contracts with outside design/planning consultants in order to strengthen its 
internal design resources. And, in order to help its partners adapt to the specifics 
of tool-making, the firm ultimately provided computer work-stations, software, 
and training programs for design-consultancy employees. Here, the dependency 
that holds Supplier D back has been addressed and remedied. (b) Over the past 
two years, Supplier B has gradually implemented a project structure cloned from 
that of Auto-Maker X. Internally, this project structure strengthens the 
relationship between the engineering and other departments. However, the 
performance of Tool-Maker B (overall loss of 0.9%) in the TR/CD comparison 
does not take into account the reorganization carried out following the CD 
project. The shift to co-development served as a strong incentive for this supplier 
to transform its structure and resources. 
Tool-Maker A is positioned as a complete service-provider from the design of 
auto-body components to their final assembly. This supplier earned a substantial 
profit from co-development in the pre-production planning stage (profit of 35%). 
The firm developed its digital design and R&D departments extensively, and five 
years ago implemented a “heavyweight” project structure (Clark and 
Wheelwright, 1992). Within the firm, organization according to project is a factor 
which promotes consistency. The project structure “holds together” all the 
investments and reorganizations by linking them to one another within a coherent 
system. It is also an attempt to duplicate the auto-maker’s own organization, thus 
facilitating the customer/supplier interface. Supplier C, like Supplier A, has been 
developing its engineering skills for many years. 
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The ability to earn profits from a co-development situation is thus strongly 
dependent on skills provided by the supplier. A skill-based approach puts the 
interpretation of performance in terms of incentives and design processes into 
perspective. Front-loading design processes and project collocalisation, even 
when associated with economic incentives are not in themselves sufficient to 
mobilize suppliers at the inception of a project. Although they positively affect 
both the early identification of required modifications and tool-cost reduction, 
profits are largely generated by tool-makers’ skills, and not merely by these 
economic incentives. Shifting economic responsibility onto the shoulders of the 
tool-maker is not enough; the means through which the tool-maker can assume 
this responsibility must also be provided by developing new engineering 
capacities, through human and technical investment within the supplier on one 
hand, and through participation of successive projects with the auto-maker on the 
other hand.  
 
3.2. The long-term stability of the co-development relationship 
 
Skills acquisition and investment by suppliers implies the extension of the inter-
corporate relationship beyond a single project. Duration over time builds trust and 
develops learning. It also represents a guarantee of revenues, i.e. profit 
expectations are increased if the contract is renewed without subterfuge on either 
side. Suppliers will not undermine the interests of a customer that can guarantee 
steady revenues. Under the system of joint participation described by Imaï and 
Itami (1984), the two parties agree to renew their cooperative venture if each one 
has fulfilled its obligations. Game theory demonstrates that the duration of the 
relationship constitutes an incentive to cooperate. In a survey dealing with the 
American and Japanese car industries, Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) note that 
the relationship between contractors and auto-makers lasts for over ten years. 
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Further, Donada and Kesseler (1997) note that customer and supplier involvment 
in co-development relationships today lasts for an average of 23 years. Co-
development is conceived as a game that is continuously replayed, but its total 
lifespan is determined by results. Although co-development reflects a strategic 
change for Auto-Maker X, and although it involves a longer-lasting relationship 
than the traditional one for design sub-contracting, the customer still does not 
guarantee the supplier that it will be systematically selected for each new 
development. Behind this uncertainty, suppliers perceive a contradiction between, 
on one side, a coherent and motivating proposition from the Auto-Maker X 
management on partnerships with suppliers; and, on the other, organized debate 
within the firm on the desirability of an alternate method (“what if, ultimately, 
selection of the lowest bidder turned out to be the least costly solution?”). This 
vacillation worries suppliers. Co-development—and the commitment to long-term 
organization and investment it involves—requires a degree of stability in the 
organizational choices made by each of the partners. “Our investment strategies 
are strongly dependent on the continuation of a sustained volume of stable 
operations in the future” (all suppliers). In today’s context of drastic reduction in 
design costs by auto-makers, the pressure on suppliers at the time of negotiation 
is very strong. The cost factor, as a determinant in the selection of suppliers, is 
indeed an integral part of the inter-corporate cooperation system. The 
estimated/negotiated cost differential observed between TR and CD projects 
(+7%) is sharply reduced for projects after the initial CD project. This pressure on 
prices reduces revenues, affects supplier profit margins adversely, and over time 
raises the question of how long co-development can be sustained: “like other 
auto-makers, X requests a 20% reduction for each new project; the problem with 
a 20% reduction is how to maintain profit margins” (all suppliers). 
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Duration does not depend solely on the amount of time allowed by the customer 
for the co-development relationship. It is also a function of the co-development 
strategy of management and suppliers. What is the “strategic intention” (Hamel 
and Prahalad, 1989) of these managers in terms of co-development? “Strategy” is 
understood in this context as the fit an organization achieves between its own 
resources/skills and the opportunities/risks created by its external environment 
(Hofer and Schendel, 1978). The formulation of medium-term strategy is the only 
way to give coherence to the investment and organizational choices implemented 
by suppliers in the context of co-development. The tool-makers’ strategies are 
closely linked to the proportion of their revenues accounted for by Auto-Maker X. 
As it happens, Auto-Maker X is a major customer for the suppliers we studied. 
The only supplier-managers who failed to offer a strategic vision were those of 
Supplier D. They consider that the implementation of co-development is 
“unnatural” since firms are not intended to cooperate, but to organize their 
relationship via the market. This supplier’s lack of project structure and 
investment in design skills reflects its lack of strategic perspective. By contrast, 
the investment of tens of millions of French francs in an ultra-modern plant, the 
development of engineering skills, the implementation of data systems, and the 
modernization of organizational systems at Supplier C reflect a strong strategic 
vision. 
 
 
Conclusion 
How to implement front-loading problem-solving strategies through co-
development ? This article explored this question on the case of a relation 
between a auto-maker and its die-tools suppliers, a typical situation where 
product and process design are tightly associated in making the development 
performance. 
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Efficiency in front-
loading strategies in 
co-development 
Our analysis showed that to be efficient in that perspective, the relations have to 
meet three kinds of conditions. On the organizational level, co-design and front-
loading methodologies ; on the contractual level, incentives for upfront learning 
and problem solving ; on the cognitive level, engineering capacities and multi-
projects cooperation learning. With this complex of conditions, co-development 
appears as a win-win situation, which is generally not the case if one of these 
conditions fails.  
 
Figure 9: the determinant factors on codevelopment front-loading efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our study, closely focussed on machine tools for the automotive industry, leaves 
some consequences of co-development unexamined. For example, we have not 
studied the effects of this new organizational method on development time-
frames, a major factor in the competition between firms developing new products. 
The development time-frame was shortened by over 10% between TR and CD 
projects, a tendency that accelerates with subsequent projects. Also unexamined 
are the effects of co-development on human-resource management (e.g.: stress 
and sometimes professional burn-out at the end of certain co-development 
projects; the effect on the relationship between project teams of coexisting but 
differing modes of customer relations practiced within the same firm). Nor have 
Project organisation and 
design processes Incentives contracting 
Cognitive ressources 
within the partners of co-
development situation  
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we further examined the effects of co-development on the machine-tool suppliers 
market. Today we are witnessing a definite trend towards vertical integration 
(e.g.: Comau in Italy) reflecting demands for industrial competence from design 
through production; and towards a widening gap between the top-ranking 
suppliers (co-developers) and those below them. Inter-corporate cooperative 
efforts are redefining the frontiers of the firm itself, and are diversifying the 
nature of inter-organizational relationships. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Below we present the calculation method, formulated ad hoc for our research purposes, used to 
arrive at the various differentials enabling us to measure co-development performance. With E1 = 
estimated cost, E2 = cost at end of Phase 1, E3 = negotiated price, E4 = cost of Phase 2 
modifications. 
 
E1 = Est. cost
Time
E3 = Neg. price E2 = Cost end Phase 1
Phase 1 Phase 2
 
 
suppliers tool reference cost cost and price results 
 
A,B,… 
 
detail by tool in lot 
E1.........
and E1.........
and E4.........
.........E2.......... 
.........E3.......... 
...................... 
diff. E1and E2 in %  
diff. E1 and E3 in % 
E4 in % of E1 
  
total lot  
∑E1.........
and ∑E1.........
and ∑E4.........
.........∑E2....... 
.........∑E3....... 
...................... 
diff. ∑E1 and ∑E2 in % 
diff. ∑E1 and ∑E3 in % 
∑E4 in % of E1 
 
 
 
total 
suppliers 
 ∑(∑E1).....
and ∑(∑E1).....
and ∑(∑E4).....
 
.....∑(∑E2)....... 
 
 
.....∑(∑E3)....... 
 
 
 
...................... 
diff. ∑(∑E2) and ∑(∑E1) 
= performance in Phase 1 
 
diff. ∑(∑E1) and ∑(∑E3) 
= effect of non-
renegotiation  of contract 
 
∑(∑E4) in % of E1 = 
modification reduction 
 
The above table was drawn up for both the CD and TR projects. The data on tables 3 and 4 in the 
body of the article show the differentials between the results obtained for each one of the projects 
(double-framed box in the above table). 
 
